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Introduction
In-group favoritism and out-group discrimination are "among the most well documented and widely observed phenomen [a] in the social sciences" (Ruffle and Sosis, 2006, p. 148) .
Evidence for the economic implications of intergroup discrimination is vast and spans from discrimination in labor, housing, credit or consumer markets to political conflict or even social unrest (see, e.g., Arrow, 1998; Darity and Mason, 1998; Ladd, 1998; Yinger, 1998; Fershtman and Gneezy, 2000; Bernhard et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2006; Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; Meier et al., 2014) . Discrimination entails potentially large efficiency costs by undermining the provision of public goods when interacting with out-group members (Habyarimana et al., 2007) .
Despite the fact that discrimination and its economic implications have been studied in many different societies and based on a multitude of attributes like ethnicity, religion, gender, or language, the development of such behavior in children is still poorly understood. This is unfortunate since a profound understanding thereof is a necessary precondition for designing effective policies which tackle discriminatory behavior before it becomes internalized (Hewstone et al., 2002; Buttelmann and Boehm, 2014) , and because recent research shows that cooperation within groups may co-evolve with out-group discrimination (Choi and Bowles, 2007) .
In this paper, we investigate in a framed field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) how intergroup discrimination evolves in childhood. We exploit an almost unique natural setting which allows us to study discrimination based on language group affiliation in Meran, a town with 38,000 inhabitants in the Northern Italian province of South Tyrol (Alto Adige).
Virtually 50% of the citizens of Meran are German-speaking and 50% Italian-speaking. While citizens of both language groups are not segregated with respect to the area of residence and thus live next-door to one another, schools -as well as most other institutions in the province -are segregated by language (see Section 2 for historical and cultural background information). We present evidence from an incentivized experiment on cooperation with 828 children, aged six to eleven years (grade one to grade five), who either speak Italian or German.
We employ a modified version of a simultaneous prisoner's dilemma game in which the identity of the interaction partner is varied across three different treatments. In one treatment, the interaction partner is from a subject's own school class, in another one from another school where the same language is spoken, though, and in a third treatment the interaction partner is from the other language group. The treatment was indicated by simply stating the name of the school (that the interaction partner attends) which is an unambiguous signal about the interaction partner's language.
Across all age groups, children cooperate significantly more with partners from their own class as compared to partners from a different school, but the same language group. The lowest level of cooperation is always observed when interaction takes place with someone from the other language group. The latter effect turns significant in the later years of primary school only, however, meaning that language discrimination seems to develop gradually.
Interestingly, this development goes hand in hand with an increase in the level of cooperation towards in-group members.
Our paper is related to an increasing literature on the development of cooperative behavior in childhood and adolescence (see, for instance, Fan, 2000; Harbaugh and Krause, 2000; Peters et al., 2004; Sally and Hill, 2006; Alencar, 2008; Cardenas et al., 2014; Lergetporer et al., 2014) . Typically, these studies have not investigated how discrimination towards members of different groups develops. One exception in a slightly different context is Fehr et al. (2008) . They ran a series of binary dictator games with subjects aged 3 to 8 years in order to study how social preferences and parochialism co-evolve. Implementing one ingroup-and one out-group condition (with receivers from the decision-maker's own play group, respectively another play group in kindergarten or school), they find that children act more prosocially towards in-group members and that this bias is most pronounced in their oldest age group of 7/8 year olds. Fehr et al. (2013) apply the same experimental paradigm to subjects aged 8 to 17 years and find that adolescents become less spiteful (more altruistic) towards in-group members from the age of 12/13 years (14/15 years) on.
Our study differs from Fehr et al. (2008 Fehr et al. ( , 2013 in at least two important dimensions. First, we implement two different out-group conditions in addition to the in-group condition.
This allows us to study the development of discrimination across the linguistic divide on top of mere in-group favoritism. In other words, we can measure the influence of language.
Second, we focus on cooperative behavior instead of distributional preferences. While both dimensions are related (Andreoni, 1995) , they have different implications in the context of intergroup discrimination: Discrimination in dictator games can be rationalized by the decision-maker's pure "taste for discrimination". In strategic situations like the prisoner's dilemma game, however, ethnic stereotypes are another possible source of discriminative behavior (see Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001) . Since experimental evidence suggests that the mere taste for discrimination cannot account for intergroup discrimination in natural environments (see Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Habyarimana et al., 2007) , we investigate the joint effect of both channels and also discuss the role of beliefs for the decision to cooperate.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief account of the historical and cultural background of the autonomous province of South Tyrol (Italy). The experimental design and procedure are introduced in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes the paper.
A brief account of historical background
Meran is the second largest city in the autonomous province of South Tyrol in the North of today's Italy. This province was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire for centuries before it was annexed by Italy in the aftermath of World War One and became part of Italy through the treaty of Saint-Germain in 1919. Although South Tyrol had been inhabited by both German and Italian speaking citizens (and a very tiny minority of Ladin-speaking citizens) before 1919, in the interwar-period and early years after World War Two the Italian government promoted the "Italianization" of South Tyrol by (i) declaring Italian the exclusive language in public offices, (ii) closing down the majority of German schools and, (iii) relocating Italians from other parts of Italy to South Tyrol. This led to considerable tensions between both language groups that culminated in a series of terrorist attacks throughout the 1960s by a group called South Tyrolean Liberation Committee. Only in the early 1970s these tensions could be resolved by implementing the Autonomous Statute which guarantees equal rights and access to the public sector to citizens of both language groups (Alcock, 1970) . In addition the statute grants the South Tyrolean considerable independence from the national government in Rome with autonomous legislative and executive power in most economic and social matters. The statute also includes several measures intended to guarantee equal rights to the different language groups, such as applying ethnic proportionality rules in public administration and the introduction of three autonomous school boards -each responsible of its own language group.
Today, of about half a million inhabitants in South Tyrol, slightly less than 70% report German and about 30% report Italian as their mother tongue. In Meran, 50.5% of the population speaks German and 49.1% Italian (with the rest of 0.4% speaking Ladin). It is noteworthy that within the city of Meran, there is almost no segregation along language lines with respect to the area of residence. Rather, citizens of both language groups live next to each other. Both groups are also predominantly catholic. However, social life is fairly segregated, with different media (like newspapers or TV channels), leisure activities (like different football clubs), and in particular schools that either teach in Italian or in German.
While the curricula of both types of schools are following the same national regulations and standards, so far there are no schools with bilingual teaching or with an equal representation of Italian-and German-speaking children. Rather, there is either an overwhelming majority of Italian-speaking or of German-speaking children attending a particular school. In fact, in our sample of 828 children there are only seven children whose parents speak only German who attend an Italian school, and only 17 children with only Italian-speaking parents attending a German school. Such a degree of segregation is typical for all levels from kindergarten to the completion of high school.
Experimental design and procedure

Design
Each subject participated in three modified one-shot prisoner's dilemma games (see Figure 1 for the payoff-matrix). In each game, a subject had a new, anonymous partner from the same grade, and this was common knowledge. Both players in each game were endowed with five tokens and had to decide simultaneously how many of the tokens (if any) to send to the partner. Each token sent was doubled. This game resembles the classic binary prisoner's dilemma game since there is a tension between the socially efficient outcome of full cooperation (i.e. sending all tokens) and selfish defection by keeping all tokens.
Figure 1 about here
The three games differed with respect to the group membership of the partner. In treatment CLASS, the partner was a randomly chosen child from the subject's own class, thus representing an in-group condition as in Fehr et al. (2013) 1 . In treatment SAME-L, the partner was from another school, but spoke the same language as the decision-making child. Finally, in treatment OTHER-L, the partner was again from another school, but spoke the other 1 Note that a child's primary school class constitutes her most important social group outside the family and that peer interactions in primary school classes are essential in the socialization process (Parsons, 1959) . Therefore, it seems natural to define children from the same school class as in-group.
language (either Italian, if the decision-making child spoke German, or vice versa). 2 Through our within-subjects design, we can measure three forms of discrimination based upon different group membership of the partner: pure language group discrimination (comparing SAME-L with OTHER-L), pure in-group favoritism (comparing CLASS with SAME-L) and the joint effect of language group discrimination and in-group favoritism (comparing CLASS with OTHER-L).
It is important to stress that the partner's language was not mentioned during the instructions in order to minimize potential experimenter demand effects. Instead, we revealed only the name of the school of the interaction partner, which is an unambiguous indication of the language that children speak in a particular school. 3 More precisely, we induced the two out-group-treatments by presenting a list of all German, respectively Italian, schools and randomly selected one of the schools, conditional on the treatment (SAME-L or OTHER-L).
4
The three games were played in random order (see the Appendix for experimental instructions and material). After children had made their three decisions, we asked them how many tokens they expected to receive from the partner in each game (again in random order).
The belief elicitation was incentivized with tokens. One randomly selected game was paid out four weeks after the experiment had taken place and tokens were exchanged for fruits, sweets and little presents 5 .
Subject pool and procedure
We conducted our experiment in all fourteen elementary schools in Meran (South Tyrol, Italy) from April to May 2012. It was approved by the Internal Review Board of the University of Innsbruck, the South Tyrolean State Board of Education, the headmasters of all schools, and by the parents of the involved children. In total, we obtained permission from 86% of parents of all primary school children in Meran to run experiments with their children (which were conducted during regular school hours). Of course, participation in the experiment was voluntary for children, but only one child opted out.
Each child was fetched individually from the classroom and brought to a separate room where the experiment was explained face-to-face by one of the experimenters (with some other experimenters explaining the experiment to other children in different corners of the room). The experimenters had to memorize the instructions of the game and explain the game orally (in the mother-tongue of the child) with some visual support. Participants were assured that all choices remained confidential. The duration of the experiment was approximately 20 minutes and it was conducted with pen and paper. In order to guarantee the understanding of the experimental instructions each child had to repeat the rules of the game and the possible consequences of different actions in its own words. In our analysis, we proceed with those 828 German-or Italian-speaking children who were able to repeat the rules of the game correctly (see Table 1 ). 6 There were 17 more children whom we exclude from the analysis because they were not able to do so.
Table 1 about here
We used little presents like sweets (lollipops, small chocolates, candies), fruits (small bags of dried apple slices, nuts and raisins) and other presents (stickers, balloons, pencils, wristbands) which children could get in exchange of their tokens in our "store". The cost of each present was equal to one token. The children were invited to come one by one into the "store" to choose their most preferred reward. As the total earnings of each child were dependent also on the decision of the partner, it was not possible to calculate the exact earnings of the children directly at the end of the experiment. Thus children received their payment (as many pieces of their most preferred reward as the number of tokens they had earned in the experiment) four weeks after the experiment. We paid close attention to maintaining anonymity in all phases of the experiment. 7 Therefore, the payoffs were handed over in sealed, non-transparent envelopes by a teacher who was not informed about the content of the experiment.
Results
Non-parametric analysis
Figure 2 shows in panel (A) the number of tokens sent to the partner, separated by treatment and age (where the five age groups coincide with grades 1 to 5 in primary school).
The level of cooperation is increasing with age (p<0.01 in each treatment, Cuzick's Wilcoxon-type tests for trend), yet there is a clear and consistent ordering across treatments.
Across all age groups, cooperation is highest in CLASS, intermediate in SAME-L, and lowest in OTHER-L (p<0.01 in each pairwise comparison, Wilcoxon signed rank tests). In general, the gap between cooperation with in-group-members (in CLASS) and out-group members (in SAME-L and OTHER-L) is getting larger with age, rather than smaller.
Figure 2 about here
This gap and its magnitude in each age group is shown in Figure 3 . The largest differences are found between CLASS and OTHER-L, a comparison that captures the joint effect of differences in language group discrimination and in-group favoritism. This difference is significant in each age group (p=0.05 for 6/7-year olds and p=0.00 from age 7/8 on, Wilcoxon signed rank tests). The pure effect of in-group favoritism (holding language constant, i.e., CLASS vs. SAME-L) is somewhat smaller in magnitude, but it is still significant for all but the youngest age cohort (p<0.05 for age 7/8 on; Wilcoxon signed ranks test). The differences between SAME-L and OTHER-L are smallest and reach statistical significance only in children aged 9/10 years and 10/11 years (p=0.02 and p=0.00, respectively; Wilcoxon signed rank tests).
In sum, we see that discrimination towards the other language-group becomes more pronounced with increasing age. There is a positive and (partly weakly) significant age trend in the differences between SAME-L and OTHER-L (p=0.07, Cuzick's Wilcoxon-type test for trend) and between CLASS and OTHER-L (p=0.03, Cuzick's Wilcoxon-type test for trend).
However, no such trend is detected in the gap between CLASS and SAME-L (p=0.147, Cuzick's Wilcoxon-type test for trend). . Across all age groups, children expect to receive on average the largest number of tokens from a partner who attends the same class (CLASS), followed by a partner from another school, but within the same language group (SAME-L), and they expect to receive the least from someone from the other language group (OTHER-L) (p<0.05 in each pairwise comparison, Wilcoxon signed rank tests). 8 Given that children seem to condition their level of cooperation on their expectations about the partner's choice, this implies that the differences between treatments are, at least partly, influenced by expectations.
Regression analysis
The patterns of non-parametric results presented above are confirmed in a regression analysis. In Table 2 , we present OLS regressions 9 with the number of tokens sent as the dependent variable, clustered on the individual level. Specification (1) demonstrates that cooperation increases significantly with age in each treatment. Girls send more tokens than boys and so do German-speaking children, compared to their Italian counterparts. The Waldtests beneath Table 2 show a significant degree of intergroup discrimination and are in line with our non-parametric analysis above: Across all age groups, cooperation is significantly higher in CLASS than in OTHER-L, indicating a pronounced joint effect of language group discrimination and in-group favoritism. Furthermore, the pure effect of in-group favoritism (CLASS vs. SAME-L) as well as the net effect of language group discrimination (SAME-L vs. OTHER-L) is highly significant (p<0.01 in each age group for CLASS vs. SAME-L; p<0.1 for 7/8 year olds and p<0.01 from 8/9 years on for SAME-L vs. OTHER-L).
Interestingly, whether or not the decision-maker has friends from the respective other language group has no influence on cooperation rates. In specification (2) we find highly significant positive correlations between beliefs and cooperation, with estimated 0.39 tokens sent more if a child expects the partner to contribute one token more. Adding beliefs does not change the sign or significance of any parameter in Table 2 , though. 
Conclusion
This paper studies how cooperation and intergroup discrimination co-evolve in childhood. We exploit the almost unique setting of Meran, a medium-sized town in the autonomous province of South Tyrol (Italy) in which about half of the citizens are German-speaking and the other half Italian-speaking. We present evidence on the development of in-group favoritism and language-group discrimination from an incentivized experiment with 828 primary school children, aged from 6/7 to 10/11 years. Varying the group membership of the interaction partner across treatments in a modified prisoner's dilemma game, we find that children have a marked inclination for in-group favoritism and language group discrimination. With respect to age dynamics, we report two main findings: First, independent of the group membership of 9 While applied economists disagree on whether models with discrete dependent variables should be estimated with OLS or non-linear approaches, we follow Angrist and Pischke (2008) and estimate our coefficients with OLS. Apart from offering the most efficient estimator and an easy interpretation, OLS is preferable when incorporating interaction terms (Ai and Norton, 2003) . Note, however, that our results hold if ordered probit models are employed (see Table A .1 in the Appendix).
the interaction partner, cooperation increases with age. Since cooperation reaps efficiency gains, this looks like a politically welcome finding. Second, however, intergroup discrimination is persistent across all age groups, and seems to increase even in the primary school years.
The driving forces behind discriminatory behavior have been subject to investigation in the recent literature (see, for instance, Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Habyarimana et al., 2007) . In our case, subjects' beliefs about their partners' choices provide one possible ingredient for discrimination, since children expect more cooperation from in-group members and less so from out-group members, particularly so when they speak a different language.
Since children seem to act in a conditionally cooperative way, more pessimistic expectations lead to less cooperation. However, given that the treatment differences in cooperation rates across all age groups remain significant after controlling for beliefs, it is likely that our results are partially also driven by some "taste for discrimination". Besides these main findings, we
show that girls exhibit higher cooperation rates than boys and that German-speaking children cooperate more than Italian-speaking children.
Despite the fact that children in Meran learn the other significant language in school, starting from the first grade, language group discrimination seems to get more pronounced with age. One possible explanation for this result might be the fact that the school system in South Tyrol is practically segregating German-and Italian-speaking children by having schools that either teach in German or Italian (except for language classes), but none that teach bilingually. While the latter might have more desirable effects in terms of closing the gap in cooperation rates based on language group discrimination, our results show that learning (and speaking) the same language as the partner does not suffice for overcoming discriminative tendencies.
Based on the evidence presented here, we see several interesting avenues for future research. First, investigating the development of discrimination in children in other natural settings would help to assess whether the effects reported here can be considered as broadly applicable or context-specific. Second, extending the investigation of discrimination in children to other behavioral domains like reciprocity or trust would be a straightforward and interesting exercise. Ultimately, a better understanding of developmental and social origins of discrimination should inform policy makers to design interventions that can diminish the degree of discrimination across different groups in society. 
9/10 10/11 Discrimination -Overview Each subject was asked to repeat the instructions in own words in order to check for understanding. 17 additional subjects were not able to do so properly, and we exclude them from the analysis. Moreover, 231 bilingual children (German and Italian) were excluded. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustered on the level of individual subjects (828 clusters).
$ The reference category is "CLASS". § This variable is equal to one if the child has at least one friend who speaks also the language of the other language group.
Experimental Instructions
Instructions are translated from German, respectively Italian, into English. Instructions were explained individually to each child in his/her mother tongue by one of the experimenters. At the end of the game you will not receive the tokens for all three decision sheets but only for a single decision sheet. This means that only one out of the three decision sheets is played and paid out for real. Which decision sheet is played and paid out will be drawn by lot.
General instructions for the assistant are italicized
This works exactly as follows.
I will mingle the three decision sheets under the table and then you can draw one decision sheet. The drawn decision sheet is the one that is played at the end and you will get only the tokens of this decision sheet; the other two decision sheets are no longer valid.
We don't know yet how many tokens you earn in this game. You receive the tokens that you keep for yourself and the tokens that your partner sends to you. Since we don't know yet how many tokens your partner will send to you, you will receive the presents not today, but in four weeks.
Your partner really exists and just like you your partner also can buy presents with the tokens he earns. Can you please repeat the part concerning which sheet is implemented for payment and how you get your presents in your own words? (Participant has to repeat: (i) 
Photos
